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RECENT DECISIONS
CARRIERs-AIRPLANES-PROVISION FOR EXEMPTION FROm LIABILITY FOR NEOLI-
GENCE.-Plaintiff's jewelry, valued at over $3,000, was lost on an interstate flight
thrbugh the negligence of the defendant air carrier. The plaintiff sued to recover the
value of the jewelry in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. The defendant contended that a provision of its tariff, duly filed with the
Civil Aeronautics Board, exempted it from liability for the loss. Summary judg-
ment was granted to the defendant. On appeal, held, one judge dissenting, judgment
affirmed, on the ground that such exculpatory provision is not forbidden to air
carriers and is properly authorized by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Litchten v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F. 2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
Prior to 1906 there was no federal statute dealing with provisions in contracts of
carriage whereby common carriers engaging in interstate commerce sought either
to exempt or to limit themselves from liability, even that due to their negligence, to-
ward the goods or passengers they carried. The validity of such provisions depended
entirely upon the law of the forum in which they were contested. If a federal court
acquired jurisdiction, and if there was no local statute on the subject, a provision
limiting the carrier's liability to an amount stipulated by the carrier and the shipper
would be upheld, but a provision totally exempting the carrier from all liability
would be held void.' In banning exemption clauses by common carriers, the federal
courts were in accord with the great majority of other jprisdictions which had dealt
with the matter. Such clauses were almost uniformly disapproved.2 However, there
was considerable diversity in the state courts over the legal effect of a carrier's
contract limiting its liability to a stipulated amount 3 Accordingly, a federal court
could apply its own permissive policy to a limitation provision, unless a local
statute provided otherwise, in which event the controversy, despite its federal forum,
1. Compania De Havigacion La Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U.S. 104 (1897); New York,
L. E. & W. R. R. v. Estill, 147 U. S. 591 (1893); Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phoenix
Insurance Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & W. Trans. Co., 117 U.S.
312 (1886); Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 112 U.S. 331 (1884); Bank of Kentucky v.
Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174 (1876); Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357
(U.S. 1873).
2. See e.g., Baughman v. Louisville, E. & St. L. R.R., 94 Ky. 150, 21 S. W. 757 (1893);
Cox v. Central Vermont Cent. R.R., 170 Mass. 129, 49 N. E. 97 (1898); Yazoo & M. V.
R.R. v. Grant, 86 Miss. 565, 38 So. 502 (1905); Echert v. Pennsylvania R.R., 211 Pa.
267, 60 AtI. 781 (1905).
Early New York cases were in accord. Cole v. Goodwin & Story, 19 Wend. 251 (N.Y.
1838). But exemption provisions were later sustained as purely private agreements. Door
v. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co., 11 N.Y. 485 (1854); Crazin v. New York Central
R.R., 51 N.Y. 61 (1872). This permissive policy was later reversed by N.Y. PERs. PaoP.
LAW § 189, and was fully repudiated by Strauss & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry., 254 N. Y.
407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930).
3. Limitation provisions by common carriers were held void as against public policy
in Broadwood v. Southern Express Co., 148 Ala. 17, 41 So. 769 (1906); Baughman v.
Louisville E. & St. L. R.R., 94 Ky. 150, 21 S.W. 757 (1893); Rhymer v. Delaware, L. &
W. R.R., 27 Pa. Super. 345 (1905). Limitation provisions were held valid in Pierce v.
Southern Pac. Co., 120 Cal. 156, 52 Pac. 302 (1898); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Miller,
79 Ill. App. 473 (1898); John Hood Co. v. American Pneumatic Service Co., 191 Mass.
27, 77 N.E. 638 (1906).
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would be determined by the local statute.4 If, however, jurisdiction was in a state
court, and the law of the state, whether by statutes or by policy,0 rendered such
provision invalid, that state law would be decisive notwithstanding the interstate
nature of the shipment7 or the fact that federal case law was the direct contrary.8
This diversity led to federal legislation which alone was able to produce uniformity
of regulation on such an important element of interstate carriage 0
Congress, in 1906, enacted The Camack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce
Act.' 0 The Supreme Court of the United States construed this statute as prohibiting
interstate rail carriers from exempting themselves, by contract or otherwise, from all
liability, but allowing such carriers to limit that liability." The Court observed that
the Carmack Amendment was a statutory declaration of the rule administered by
the federal courts prior to the federal statute.12 All state law on exemption and
limitation provisions by interstate rail carriers was superseded by the Carmack
Amendment, by means of which Congress exercised its hitherto dormant, but con-
ceded right to regulate this element of interstate commerce.13 Similar statutes were
later enacted by Congress applying to water' 4 and motor'S carriers engaged in inter-
state commerce.
If an interstate air carrier, at any time before June 1938, the date of the Civil
Aeronautics Act, sought to enforce a provision limiting its liability, it would find
itself in the same position as other interstate carriers were before such matters were
brought under federal statutes.16 Up to May 21, 1938, federal courts, in the absence
of a local or federal statute upon the matter, would find the basis for their invalidation
of exemption provisions by air carriers, in a diversity of citizenship action, embedded
in the "'general law' as to which federal courts exercised an independent judg-
ment."'17 This foundation was swept away on that date, however, by the decision
in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. s Accordingly, if an air carrier sought validation of an
exemption provision in the month period between the decision in Eric R.R. v.
Tompkins and the date upon which the Civil Aeronautics Act became law, the
applicable law would be that of the state where suit was brought, whether the court
4. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 18 (U.S. 1842).
5. Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133 (1898).
6. Pennsylvania R. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477 (1903).
7. "It is'well settled that the State may make valid enactments in the exercise of its
legislative power to promote the welfare and convenience of its citizens, although in their
operation they may have an effect upon interstate traffic." Id. at 488. See also Adams
Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913); Chicago, Al. & St. Paul R.R. v. Solan,
169 U.S. 133 (1898).
8. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1875); Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477, 486 (1903).
9. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 (1913).
10. 34 STAr. 593 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 20 (11) (1951).
11. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 (1913).
12. Id. at 511.
13. Id. at 506.
14. 27 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. § 190 (1951).
15. 49 STAT. 563 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 319 (1951).
16. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 (1913).
17. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 75 (1938).
18. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
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be federal or local. Were it not for the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the ex-
culpatory provision relied upon by the defendant in the instant case would be void
under New York law,' 9 and thereby, under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
the plaintiff would be entitled to recover. The issue in the instant case is how, if at
all, the Civil Aeronautics Act changes the state of the law regarding exculpatory
provisions for air carriers that existed prior to its enactment.
The majority holds that although the language of the Act is silent upon the sub-
ject, exemption provisions come within its purview, for Congress, seeking uniformity
of rates and services in air transportation, desired that a single agency, rather than
numerous courts operating under diverse laws, have primary responsibility for super-
vising such rates and services. Dissenting vigorously, Judge Frank denies that the
scope of the Act extends to exculpatory clauses, contending that since the Act is
silent on the matter of the validity of such provisions, there is no federal statute
on the subject, and therefore the validity of the provisions must be determined by
the law of the state in which they are contested. Further, the dissenting opinion
declares that even if it were to be conceded, due to the desire of Congress that uni-
form rules should govern interstate air carriage, that the doctrine of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins did not apply, Congress could not have intended merely by remaining
silent to authorize the Board to adopt a policy flatly at odds with the hitherto uni-
form federal policy denying validity to exculpatory provisions.
It is submitted that the most probable effect of Congressional silence is to leave
those provisions outside the sphere of federal legislation, and thereby subject to
state rulings. However, it is possible that Congress desired to encompass the entire
enterprise of civil aeronautics, including all elements of its variegated structure,
when it enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act. If that be the case, it would seem that
in the absence of an express clause in the statute disposing of the legality of ex-
culpatory provisions the intent of Congress must be assumed, in the absence of a
compelling reason or a conspicuous statement in the statute's legislative history
to the contrary, to have this element of interstate air carriage conform to the broad
pattern of regulations by which Congress, in its prior dealings with similar pro-
visions of non-air carriers, constantly refused to accord exculpatory clauses legal
effect. Clearly, Congress may not be deemed to have intended, by remaining silent,
to permit air carriers to enforce a contract provision for exemption of liability
uniformly forbidden to all other types of carriers in the interstate scheme. Such
an intention, imputed by the majority in the name of uniformity of national carriage,
actually operates to introduce diversity. The sound reasons, for prohibiting a com-
mon carrier from exempting itself from liability towards its cargo20 apply equally
to all carriers, regardless of the medium through which they are propelled.
19. Cf. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 189. See also Strauss & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry.,
254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E. 564 (1930).
20. The rationale of the cases cited in notes 1, and 2, supra, is that common carriers,
as distinct from ordinary bailees, are powerful enough to extort for themselves In-
equitable exculpatory provisions from the public, and if allowed to do so, would not
treat the public or its goods with care and diligence. The law, therefore, for reasons
of public policy, steps between the parties and imposes upon one of them a liability that
necessarily creates a high degree of care. What exists, therefore, between the parties,
is a relation imposed by law, upon which the law insists and which cannot be abrogated
by either or both of the parties.
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CONTRACTS-DISPUTES CLAUSE IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACT-FINALTY OF DEPART-
2IENT HEAD'S DECISION N ABSENCE or FRAUr--The plaintiff agreed to construct a
dam for the United States under a government construction contract containing the
standard "disputes clause" which provides that all disputes involving questions of
fact shall be decided by the contracting officer, with the right of appeal to the head
of the department "whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties."
A number of claims arising out of disputes were filed with the contracting officer
whose decision insofar as it was adverse was appealed to the head of the department-
in this instance, the Secretary of the Interior. Dissatisfied with the latter's resolu-
tion of the disputes, the contractor brought suit in the Court of Claims. That court
set aside the decision of the department head in respect to one claim involving a
question of fact on the ground that the plaintiff did not agree, by signing the con-
tract, to be bound by arbitrary and capricious administrative decisions made in dis-
regard of accepted practices of trade and proper accounting methods. The Supreme
Court of the United States, reversing the Court of Claims, held, three justices dis-
senting, that the decision of the department head is conclusive unless impeached by
proof of actual fraud. United States v. Wunderlich et al., 342 U. S. 98 (1951).
That a provision such as Article 151 is valid in both governmental and private
contracts is well-settled. 2 Parties competent to make contracts are also competent
to make agreements concerning the method of settling factual disputes.3 Since the
validity of the clause cannot be challenged, the essential issue is: to what extent
may the courts overthrow a decision of a department head made in conformity with
such provisions?
On its face, the disputes clause appears to be conclusive. By express terms, it is
stated that all disputes concerning questions of fact are to be decided by the con-
tracting officer and, if affirmed on appeal to the department head, the decision is to
be final and conclusive on the parties. However, the courts have long recognized an
exception to the finality of departmental findings of fact. Where the officer's decision
has involved fraud or such gross mistake as would necessarily imply bad faith, judi-
cial review has been granted. This exception was first expressed by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1854- and has since been reiterated in numerous
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Court of Claims decisions.5 As late as 1950,
1. Article 15. "Disputes.-Except as otherwise specifically provided in this contract, all
disputes concerning questions of fact arising under this contract shall be decided by the
contracting officer subject to written appeal by the contractor within 30 days to the head
of the department concerned or his duly authorized representative, whose decision -hall be
final and conclusive upon the parties thereto. In the meantime the contractor fhall dili-
gently proceed with the work as directed."
2. United States v. Moorman et a!., 338 U. S. 457 (1950); Chicago, Santa Fe & Cal.
R.R. v. Price, 138 U. S. 185 (1891); Martinsburg & Potomac R.R. v. March, 114 U. S. 549
(1885); Sweeney v. United States, 109 U. S. 618 (1883); Kihlberg v. United States, 97
U. S. 398 (1878).
3. United States v. Moorman et al., 338 U. S. 457 (1950).
4. Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. 344 (U. S. 1854).
5. See e.g., Ripley v. United States, 223 U. S. 695 (1912); United States v. Gleason,
175 U. S. 588 (1900); see note 2 supra. See also Lindsay et al. v. United States, 181 F. 2d
582 (9th Cir. 1950); S. J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warren, 135 F. 2d 264 (D. C. Cir. 1943);
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 963 (Ct. Cl. 1950); Mitchell
Canneries, Inc. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 498 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
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in United States v. Moorman et al., G the Supreme Court of the United States con-
firmed this view by stating that such findings are "'conclusive, unless impeached on
the ground of fraud, or such gross mistake as necessarily implied bad faith.' "T
Subsequent to this decision, the Court of Claims in Penner Installation Corp. v.
United States,8 interpreted the decision in the Moorman case as not altering the
time-honored exceptions, and continued to follow its customary position of reversing
departmental decisions which were fraudulent or "so grossly erroneous as to show
bad faith." 9 Where the contracting officer acted arbitrarily or capriciously, bad faith
was implied. The Court of Claims pointed out that the contracting officer's decision,
to be conclusive, must have been rendered with due regard to the rights of both
the contracting parties.' 0 "He must not act as a representative of one of the con-
tracting parties, but as an impartial, unbiased judge."" Failure to do so would give
the Court of Claims jurisdiction to set aside his decision. This view was endorsed
by the Court of Claims in the present action.12
In the instant case, the majority of the Court held that under Article 15, the decl-
sion of the department head in a dispute involving a question of fact is final unless
founded on fraud. To be set aside for fraud, fraud must be alleged and proved as It
is never presumed. 13 "Arbitrary," "capricious," or "grossly erroneous" decisions are
not the equivalent of fraud. Fraud is "conscious wrong-doing, an intention to cheat
or be dishonest."'14 In the absence of fraudulent conduct so defined, the decision of
the department head must stand as conclusive. The Court noted that if this standard
is too limited, legislative action is the proper remedy.
In a strong dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out that the majority
view not only reads out of the heretofore undisputed exception the important phrase
"or such gross mistake as necessarily implies bad faith,"'u but adds an exceedingly
rigid meaning to the word "fraud." While contracting parties are at liberty to place
the decision of their disputes in the hands of one of them, it is observed that one
who bargains to be made judge of his own cause impliedly covenants to do justice.
The door to judicial relief should not be closed on the victim of arbitrary action who
is unable to prove conscious fraud.
Mr. Justice Douglas correctly observes in his dissenting opinion that "the instant
6. 338 U. S. 457 (1950). The Moorman case involved the conclusiveness of the findings
of the contracting officer on a question of contract interpretation; specifically, whether
or .not the work demanded of the contractor was outside the requirements of the contract.
The court considered whether this was a question of law or fact, but felt it unnecessary
to decide the point. It was held that certain provisions in the specifications making the
Secretary of War's decision on this issue final were not in conflict with or limited by
Article 15, for the latter expressly excepts methods of settlement otherwise specifically pro-
vided in the contract. The court concluded that in either event the denial of the con-
tractor's claim was final and not subject to reconsideration by the Court of Claims.
7. Id. at 461.
8. 89 F. Supp. 545 (Ct. Cl.), aff'd per curiarn, 340 U. S. 898 (1950).
9. Id. at 547.
10. Citing Ripley v. United States, 223 U. S. 695 (1912).
11. Penner Installation Corp. v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 545, 547 (Ct. Cl.), afl'd per
curiam, 340 U. S. 898 (1950).
12. See Wunderlich et al. v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 92 (1950).
13. United States v. Colorado Anthracite Co., 225 U. S. 219 (1912).
14. United States v. Wunderlich et al., 342 U. S. 98, 100 (1951).
15. United States v. Moorman et al., 338 U. S. 457, 461 (1950).
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case reveals only a minor facet of the age-long struggle" against "the unlimited dis-
cretion of some civil or military official, some bureaucraL"10
It is submitted that the dissenting opinions enunciate a more liberal and healthy
rule. Despite the express terms of the contract clause, even the narrow view espoused
by the majority in the principal case permits an exception-fraud. The contractor
is not held absolutely to his bargain. The question of judicial review thus becomes
one of degree, not of principle.
If intentional fraud is the sole basis for setting aside an administrative decision,
one who contracts with the government is put at the mercy of any arbitrary, capri-
cious, or negligent official whose actions fall short of fraud.17 As Mr. Justice Douglas
ably points out in his dissenting opinion, "the rule we announce has wide application
and devastating effect. It makes a tyrant out of every contracting officer ... even
though he is stubborn, perverse or captious."' 8 Unless the Supreme Court of the
United States modifies this rule, legislation would seem to be the only recourse.1 0
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FoURTEENTH AmENDMENT-VALIDITY OF LEGISLATION
REGULATING SEGREGATION OF INTRASTATE PASSENGERS ON Busr.s.-Plaintiff, a Negro,
boarded a bus operated by the defendant bus company, holding a ticket from Suffolk
to Norfolk, both cities within the state boundaries of Virginia. At the time an almost
equal number of Negroes and whites were seated in the bus, with only one vacant
seat and that in the front part of the bus next to a white woman. Plaintiff seated
himself in the only available seat. Upon noticing the situation, the driver, acting in
accordance with the Virginia statutes which require state motor carriers to segregate
white and Negro passengers, asked the plaintiff to move. The plaintiff refused to
move, and when the driver offered to return his fare this was also refused. When
police assistance failed to remove him, the driver emptied the bus and then let
everyone reenter but prevented plaintiff from doing so. Plaintiff brought a proceed-
ing before the State Corporation Commission to enjoin the defendant bus company
from discriminating against him because of his race and color. Upon appeal from
the denial of his petition, held, one justice dissenting, order affirmed. The enforce-
ment of the Virginia segregation statutes did not violate the plaintiff's right to the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
16. United States v. Wunderlich et al., 342 U. S. 98, 101 (1951).
17. One of the plaintiff's principal objections in the instant case was to the assignment
by the contracting officer of arbitrary hourly figures for the cost of repairs and maintenance
of machines. For example, he awarded substantially the same hourly rate for a $2C0 jack
hammer as for a $20,000 tractor.
18. See note 16 supra.
19. On January 22, 1952, Senator McCarran introduced S.2487 which would specially
overrule the unfortunate decision in the principal case by providing that the disputes clame
shall not be construed "to limit judicial review of any such decision only to cases in which
fraud by such Government officer or such head of department or agency or his repre-
sentative is alleged."
On January 24, 1952, Representative Celler introduced a similar bill, H. R. 6214, adding
to chapter 19 of Title 28 of the United States Code a new section providing that the
Court of Claims or any District Court may disregard a decision by a federal officer under
the disputes clause if it "was founded on fraud or involved such gross mistake as neces-
sarily implied bad faith, or was arbitrary or capricious." These bills, which would restore
the law to the status which prevailed prior to the instant decision, are now in Committee.
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States Constitution. Commonwealth ex rel. Raney v. Carolina Coach Co. of Virginia,
66 S. E. 2d 572 (Va. 1951).
The statutes of Virginia provide for separation of the white and colored races1
in passenger vehicles but require that there be no discrimination in either quality
or convenience of the separate accommodations.2 The statute also expressly states
"but no contiguous seats on the same bench shall be occupied by white and colored
passengers at the same time."3
There are many similar statutes4 and many precedents in the decisionsu upholding
the validity of state racial segregation statutes. In Mobile & 0. R. R. v. Spenny0
it was held that statutes providing for equal but separate accommodations on passen-
ger trains for white and Negro races was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. But a state is required by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to extend to citizens of the white and colored races substantially equal
treatment in all facilities or privileges provided for by public funds. A state may,
however, choose the methods by which equality is to be maintained and is not
required to provide privileges for the members of both races in the same place,7
nor is it necessary that the privileges extended be identical; if they are equal it is
sufficient.8 Racial distinctions of all types may furnish legitimate grounds for sepa-
ration under some conditions of social and governmental necessities0 and where the
method adopted does not amount to a denial of fundamental constitutional rights, the
segregation of races, whether by statute or by private agreement, is not against
public policy.10
Intrastate and interstate commerce have been held to be djstinctly severable and,
therefore, each is subject to different authority and regulations.1' Thus when the
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-326 (1950).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-327 (1950).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-328 (1950).
4. See e.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 276.440 (1948) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 5518, 5527 (Michle
1938); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 201 (1951) ; ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 48, §§ 196, 197 (1940);
MIss. CODE AmN. § 7784 (1942), § 7785 (Supp. 1950); ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1614,
1615 (1947); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-206, 18-207, 18-210 (1935); LA. REV. STAT. § 45:528
(1950) ; S. C. CODE ANN. § 8530-1 (1942) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-135, 60-136 (1943).
S. See e.g., Payne v.' Stevens, 260 U. S. 705 (1922); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Common-
wealth, 179 U. S. 388 (1900); Bowie v. Birmingham Railway & Elec. Co., 125 Ala. 397,
27 So. 1016 (1900); Mobile & 0. R.R. v. Spenny, 12 Ala. App. 375, 67 So. 740 (1914);
Bradford v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry., 83 Ark. 244, 124 S. W. 516 (1910); Patterson v.
Taylor, 51 Fla. 275, 40 So. 493 (1906) ; Hillman v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 126 Ga.
814, 56 S. E. 68 (1906); Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 144 Ky. 502, 133 S. W.
1158 (1911); Ohio Valley Ry's. Receiver v. Lander, 104 Ky. 431, 48 S. W. 145 (1898);
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Redmond, 119 Miss. 765, 81 So. 115 (1919); Morrison v. State,
116 Tenn. 534, 95 S. W. 494 (1906).
6. 12 Ala. App. 375, 67 So. 740 (1914). Cf. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 48, §§ 196, 197 (1940).
7. Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 AtI. 590 (1936).
8. Daviess County Board of Education et al. v. Johnson, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590
(1918).
9. Porterfield v. Webb, 195 Cal. 71, 231 Pac. 554 (1924); Piper et al. v. Big Pine
School District et al., 193 Cal. 664, 226 Pac. 926 (1924).
10. Corrigan et al. v. Buckley, 299 Fed. 899 (D. C. Cir. 1924), appeal dismissed, 271
U. S. 323 (1926).
11. New v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. et al., 186 Va. 726, 43 S. E. 2d 872 (1947).
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application of a state statute amounts to a burden on interstate commerce, as regu-
lated by the Interstate Commerce Act,12 the statute as applied to interstate com-
merce will be invalid. Despite its invalidity with regard to interstate commerce the
statutes are deemed severable in their application and legal effect can be given to
the part affecting intrastate commerce alone.23
Accordingly in its decisions the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld
state segregation statutes when applied to intrastate commerce. In Plkssy v. Fergu-
son'4 the plaintiff, a Negro traveling intrastate in Louisiana w-as requested to move
from a coach reserved for whites to one reserved for colored. Upon his refusal, he
was arrested. The Court held that the state segregation statute was valid and con-
stitutional and that physical separation of the races does not imply inferiority of
either race and is within the state's police power in preserving public peace and
good order. The Court stressed the fact that while the accommodations may be
separate, they must be equal, to be within the Fourteenth Amendment.
In dealing with the question of equal accommodations the Supreme Court has
said, "It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws,"' o
and not merely a group or class as such. Therefore it is no defense that such dis-
criminatory action is exceedingly rare and only affects an individual occasionally
under a peculiar set of facts.' 0 In New v. Atlantic Grcylwund Corp.17 the court
said, "no party shall be required to give up a seat for one of poorer quality or
convenience in accommodation for such traveling passenger."' 8 Thus in Mitchell iV.
United States et aL 9 the plaintiff, a Negro, who was traveling first class was denied
an available Pullman car seat due to state segregation laws and was forced to ride
second class. Upon hearing the plaintiff's complaint the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission found as a fact that requests by Negroes for Pullman accommodation were
negligible and found that coach and drawing rooms met the Interstate Commerce
Act's requirements for equality. In reversing the decision the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the volume of traffic cannot justify the denial of a funda-
mental right of equality of treatment. In Hendersont v. Uidtcd States,O the plaintiff,
a Negro traveling first class on an interstate railroad, entered the dining car and
found all the seats taken but one at a table where three white persons were seated.
The plaintiff was refused the vacant seat and there being no other available seats,
was forced to go without eating. Upon reversing the decision below the Supreme
Court indicated that so long as there are accommodations a person could not, with-
out a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, be denied service. The court stated:
"The appellant here was denied a seat in the dining car although at least one seat
12. 24 STAT. 380 (1887) as amended, 41 STAT. 479 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 3(1) (1929).
The statute states that it shall be unlawful for any common carrier to give any undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular description of traffic, or to sub-
ject the same to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect
whatsoever.
13. New v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. et al., 186 Va. 726, 43 S. E. 2d 872 (1947).
14. 163 U. S. 537 (1896).
15. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S. 80, 97 (1941).
16. Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 816 (1950); McCabe v. Atchinson, T. & S. F.
Ry., 235 U. S. 151 (1914).
17. 186 Va. 726, 43 S. E. 2d 872 (1947).
18. Id. at 875.
19. 313 U. S. 80 (1941).
20. 339 U. S. 816 (1950).
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was vacant and would have been available to him, under the existing rules, if he had
been white."21 The Court held that the plaintiff's right to the equal protection of
the laws had been violated.
Although it appears that no such conduct as encountered in the instant case has
ever before presented itself in intrastate commerce, it has presented itself under
rather similar circumstances and has been condemned by the Supreme Court of the
United States in interstate commerce. In view of those decisions it would seem that
plaintiff's constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment were
clearly violated.
Discrimination as such is the same as far as the individual's rights are concerned
whether encountered in interstate or intrastate commerce; and when found in the
former, as in the instant case, the statute ought to be regarded as a violation of the
fundamental and inalienable rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The principal case presents the unique circumstance of such a distribution of the
races in the bus that only one seat was available and the only one standing was a
member of the other race. Separation here would prevent equal treatment and equal
treatment would violate separation. The court unfortunately preferred separation
to equality of treatment. Where segregation and equal treatment conflict the latter
must prevail.
Assuming that segregation is supportable on the theory of the police power of
the state in the promotion of public peace and good order 22 the present decision
seems vulnerable. The state now permits occupancy of contiguous seats on the same
bench by white and colored passengers if all other seats are occupied in the case of
transportation by electric railways.23 Why the propinquity of races should be objec-
tionable in motor vehicles and not in those propelled by electricity is not clear. It
would seem that public peace and good order would not be jeopardized by an amend-
ment to the statute in issue to conform with the electric railway statute.
CRIMINAL LAw-CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-DRIVER WHO KILLS PERSON Wi1LE
STRICKEN BY RECURRENCE OF PAST ILLNESS AS GUILTY OF CRIME.-Defendant had
received treatment for an ailment diagnosed as Meniere's Syndrome, a disturbance
of the semicircular canals of the ear, which might cause him at any time to lose
consciousness or "black out" without warning. Upon his discharge by his physician,
on July 26, 1949, defendant was advised that the disease might recur at any time
and was further advised to be very careful while driving and if possible never to
drive alone. On July 1, 1950, fifteen months after the first and only of such attacks,
defendant suffered a second attack while driving and crashed into another auto-
mobile fatally injuring the driver. He was convicted of a misdemeanor, waiving
trial by jury. Upon appeal, held, one judge dissenting, conviction affirmed. State v.
Gooze, 14 N. J. Super. 227, 81 A. 2d 811 (1951).
The statute under which the defendant was convicted provides: "Any person who
shall cause the death of another by driving any vehicle carelessly and heedlessly in
willful or wanton disregard of the rights of safety of others shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor. . . ..1 Before the enactment of the statute in 1935 all cases which in-
21. Id. at 824.
22. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896)
23. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-392 (1950).
1. N. J. STAT. A.N. § 2: 138-9 (1935).
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volved circumstances similar to the instant one were provided for by the man-
slaughter section of the statutes.2 A survey of the convictions and acquittals under
the "automobile manslaughter" statutes of this and other states indicates that the
motivating force behind the statute was to facilitate convictions since juries had been
reluctant to convict for manslaughter feeling the guilt of the defendant to be
slight.3 The former statute subjected the convicted to a fine of one thousand dollars
and/or imprisonment up to ten years, whereas the instant statute reduced the term
to three years while retaining the same fine.4 The legislature, however, while estab-
lishing the present statute endeavored to retain the old common law qualifications
for manslaughter.
Criminal negligence, derived from common law manslaughter, requires proof of
a mens rea,5 which is, essentially, the state of mind of one who persists in a course
of conduct (act or omission) foreseeing its probable consequences of harm to others
but with no desire to bring them about. This mental state has been narrowed to the
simple term "recklessness," 6 which is distinguished from both negligence and intent.7
To sustain a conviction there must be more than ordinary civil negligence, s w,,hile
intent requires a will on the part of the actor that the result occuro Courts today
try to suggest the connotation of criminal negligence in such phraseology as "gross
negligence," "wanton conduct," "culpable negligence," and "criminal negligence."' 0
The term "criminal negligence" implies that in addition to a consciousness of the
probable consequences there must be created by the conduct an unreasonable risk
of bodily harm to another.'1 Because of the serious penalties imposed therefor it
has been much discussed by the courts and the journals, but as yet there is no
generally accepted definition of the term and some writers have gone so far as to
call it indefinable.12 However, in every attempt to make the term comprehensible
2. N. 3. STAT. ANN. § 2: 138-5 (1898).
3. Riesenfeld, Negligent Homiide, A Study in. Statutory Interpretation, 25 CArw. L.
REy. 1 (1936). "Complaints have been made that petty juries are obstinately unwilling
to convict motorists for manslaughter. The word manslaughter suggests to many lay minds
some kind of brutal criminality; they find an incongruity in associating it with a prisoner
of respectable appearance." Turner, Mens Rea and Motorists, 5 CAM. L. 3. 61 (1933).
4. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2: 103-6 (1898); N. J. STAT. Azz. § 2: 138-5 (1898).
5. However, there are some authorities who disagree with the mens rea theory and
suggest that criminal negligence does not require a inens rea but rather disregards the
mental state. See Mopm.xAzw, A RATiONAr.E or CaninAL NEG.mUOLCE 39 (1944).
6. See Turner, supra note 3.
7. HALL, GmeRAL PRm!cnLFs or CRmIMmAL LAw 232 (1947).
8. State v. Blaine, 104 N. J. L. 325, 140 AUt. 566 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928); State v.
Schutte, 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 AUt. 112 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd 88 N. 3. L. 396, 96 Af.. 659
(Ct. Err. & App. 1916); People v. Angelo, 246 N. Y. 451, 159 N. E. 394 (1927).
9. People ex rel. Hegemen v. Corrigan, 195 N. Y. 1, 13, 87 N. E. 792, 796 (1909).
Where criminal intent is required, it cannot be legally presumed from the act. blorissette
v. United States, 72 Sup. Ct. 240, 255 (1951).
10. 2 REsTATSZENT, TORTs § 500 (1934) ; Andrews v. Director of Public Proseecution,
[1937] A. C. 576. It has been suggested, in an attempt at more precise definition, that
these terms are not the noun "negligence" qualified by adjectives, but rather new com-
pound nouns with a different meaning. Turner, Mens Rea and Motorists, S C,-as. L. J.
61 (1933).
11. 2 RESTATKMENT, TORTS § 500 (1934).
12. Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide, A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 25 CA r. L.
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and workable, courts have emphasized the aforementioned connotation of reck-
lessness.' 3
In the leading New Jersey case of State v. Blaine,'4 it was held that to establish
criminal negligence it is necessary to show that one, with knowledge of existing
conditions and conscious from such knowledge that injury will naturally or probably
result from his conduct and with reckless indifference to the consequences, con-
sciously and intentionally does some wrongful act or omits to discharge some duty
which produces the injurious result. This would seem a proper statement of the
law, and is relied upon by the majority of the court in the principal case. Yet it is
doubtful whether such test was properly applied there. One can hardly be considered
reckless and acting in complete indifference to a probable result of injury to others if,
after having been free for fifteen months from any symptom of the infirmity which
may cause him to lose control of his faculties, during which time he regularly dis-
charged his daily duties, he drove his automobile alone. Any inference from such
uncontradicted circumstances of "a wanton disregard of the rights of safety of
others" would seem to be unwarranted.',
The majority of the court held that it was forseeable by the defendant that if
he blacked out while driving, the probable consequence might be injury to others.
This may be true as a generality but does not appear to be the test of criminal
negligence under the facts of the instant case. Such a conclusion under the instant
facts would be permissible only if, as the dissenting opinion observed, the defendant
was proven to have been mentally aware that at a time reasonably near the time
of the fatal occurrence he would "black out" with the probable consequences. No
such proof existed.
The facts under consideration are unique. No reported case has been found in-
volving a death caused by an affliction similar to this.10 Perhaps the most analogous
are those dealing with the consequence of driving a car despite obvious somnolence
or the knowledge that one is an epileptic. In State v. Olsen,117 the court affirmed a
verdict for involuntary manslaughter by a truck driver who, while driving in a resi-
dential area, fell asleep, after realizing a sensation of drowsiness, and killed a child.
The basis for upholding the conviction was that while one cannot be responsible
for what he does during the unconsciousness of sleep, he is criminally negligent
for allowing himself to go to sleep under the surrounding circumstances.18 In cases
where the defendant is suffering from epilepsy the deciding factor appears to be
whether he knows of the fairly frequent nature of his attacks.'0 The decisions in
such cases do not support the holding in the principal one.
REv. 1 (1936); Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAM.n. L. J.
31 (1936).
13. State v. Linarducci, 122 N. J. L. 137, 3 A. 2d 796 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Eatley v.
Mayer, 9 N. J. Misc. 918 (Cir. Ct. 1931), afi'd, 10 N. J. Misc. 219, 158 Ati. 411 (Sup. Ct.
1932) ; Smith v. State, 197 Miss. 802, 20 So. 2d 701 (1945). See also State v. Harlow,
6 N. J. Misc. 149, 140 AUt. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
14. 104 N. J. L. 325, 140 Atl. 566 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928).
15. State v. Linarducci, 122 N. J. L. 137, 3 A. 2d 796 (Sup. Ct.) aff'd per curiam,
123 N. J. L. 228, 8 A. 2d 576 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939), the court in convicting the defendant
said that mere carelessness even in the violation of a vehicle traffic law is not enough to
satisfy the statute.
16. See State v. Gooze, 14 N. J. Super. 227, 81 A. 2d 811, 816 (1951).
17. 108 Utah 377, 160 P. 2d 427 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
18. See Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 AUt. 432 (1925).
19. See Tift v-. State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S. E. 41 (1916), where the court approved
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A more realistic and effective protection for the traveling public from the ill-
advised driving of those physically incapable of safety driving alone would be to
enact specific legislation preventing those with such maladies as that suffered by
the defendant from being issued a driver's licenseY0 They would then not be tempted
to over-assess their own degree of health.
TAXATION-EARNINGS OF NON-ESmIDENT UNITED STATES CrCzEN.-Taxpayer, a
resident of Oklahoma, entered into a contract in 1944 with a Brazilian Corporation
to work on the construction of a refinery plant in Saudi Arabia. The length of em-
ployment was to be eighteen months but it was understood that the taxpyer could
work longer if he desired. Taxpayer left the United States in December 1944 and
worked in Saudi Arabia until May 1946 when, having become dissatisfied with cer-
tain personnel changes he returned to the United States. The corporation provided
living quarters in barracks and meals. Taxpayer's wife remained in the United States
all the time he was abroad. No taxes were paid to the government of Saudi Arabia
and the income earned in Saudi Arabia was included in his income tax return for
1945 and tax paid on it. No action having been taken on his claim for refund he then
brought an action against the Collector of Internal Revenue to recover the amount
paid on the ground that he was a bona fide resident of a foreign country during
an entire taxable year and therefore such income was exempt from tax under Sec-
tion 116 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.. The District Court entered a judgment
for plaintiff. On appeal, held, one judge dissenting, reversed and remanded on the
ground that the taxpayer was not a bona fide resident of Saudi Arabia for the entire
taxable year 1945 and his income was therefore not exempt from taxation. Jones v.
Kyle, 190 F. 2d 353 (10th Cir. 1951).
Section 116 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides for exemption from tax
income derived from sources outside the United States by a citizen who establishes
to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that he v.'as a bona fide
resident of a foreign country during the entire taxable year. Whether or not he was
a bona fide resident is to be determined by application of Treasury Regulation 111,
§§ 29.211-1-29.211-5 relating to what constitutes residence in the United States on
the following instructions to the jury: "If however, you find beyond a reasonable doubt
that at the time of said collision and injuries the defendant was subject to frequent attacks
of vertigo or similar afflictions . . . and that with full knowledge that he was subject
to such attacks and the effect of such attacks, defendant was intentionally running said
automobile. . . and while thus running said car defendant suffered a customary attack ...
which rendered him powerless... defendant would be guilty of the offense of an assault and
battery." Id. at 665, 88 S. E. at 41 (italics supplied). See also People v. Freeman, 61 Cal.
App. 2d 110, 142 P. 2d 435 (1943), where the appellate court reversed a conviction for
negligent homicide of the defendant who bad frequently suffered epileptic attacks since he
was nine years of age. He felt ill at a friend's home prior to the accident and having been
given two drinks of whiskey said: "I think I can make it home, there is where I belong. '
The appellate court reversed because the trial court failed to submit to the jury the ques-
tion of whether at the time he was under such attack and not capable of reasoning.
20. The defendant's conduct in the instant case does not apparently involve any viola-
tion of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Law and any other regulatory statute. Cf.
39 N. J. STAT. Awx. (1940).
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the part of an alien.' Treasury Regulation 111, § 29.211-22 describes an alien actu-
ally present in the United States, who is not a mere transient or sojourner, as a
resident of the United States for income tax purposes. A person who comes to the
United States for a definite purpose which in its nature may be promptly accom-
plished is a transient. A mere floating intention to return to another country in-
definite as to time is not sufficient to constitute a person a transient. Further a
person who comes to the United States for a purpose of such a nature that an
extended stay may be necessary to accomplish it and makes his home temporarily in
the United States to that end becomes a resident even though he may at all times
have an intention to return to his domicile abroad when the purpose for which he
came has been accomplished.
Section 116 (a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code differs in its requirements of
bona fide residence for an entire taxable year from the requirements set out when
the exemption was first enacted as Section 213 (b) (14) of the Revenue Act of 1926.8
The latter statute was satisfied by a showing of bona fide nonresidence without the
United States for more than six months of the taxable year and was interpreted by
the courts to mean that proof of mere absence from the United States for the re-
quired time was all that was necessary to establish nonresidence.4
The Tax Court decisions point out that whether the taxpayer was a bona fide
resident of a foreign country is a question of fact depending on the circumstances
of each case.5 In the so called "war contract" cases where the taxpayers were hired
by corporations having contracts with the United States Government to construct air
and defense bases in foreign countries and in pursuance of such employment pro-
ceeded to a foreign country it has generally been held that they were not bona fide
residents of the foreign countries even though they remained abroad for a year
or more. 6
These decisions were based on the facts that the taxpayers while abroad were
subject to military control, lived in barracks or huts provided by their employer,
and their families were not allowed to accompany them; they paid no taxes to the
foreign government and their intention was not to remain permanently but to return
to their homes in the United States as soon as their jobs were finished. The result
of these cases seems clearly correct since for all practical purposes there was merely
an extension of the United States to the localities where the taxpayers were working
and they were not in any real sense bona fide residents of a foreign country. That
such persons were not intended to be entitled to exemptions within the meaning of
the amendment was pointed out by Senator George at the hearing before the Senate
Finance Committee at the time the statute was amended. He explained that the
1. See Sen. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1943); U. S. Treas. Reg. 103,
§ 19.116-1 (1943), T. D. 5230, 1943 Cum. Bu=rx. 299.
2. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.211-2 (1949).
3. 44 STAT. 9 (1926).
4. See e.g., Downs v. Commissioner, 166 F. 2d 504 (9th Cir.), cert. denled, 334 U. S.
832 (1948); Commissioner v. Swent et ux., 155 F. 2d 513 (4th Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
329 U. S. 801 (1947) ; Paul J. Fichter, 9 T. C. 1126 (1947).
5. Herman F. Baehre, 15 T. C. 236 (1950); Audio G. Harvey, 10 T. C. 183 (1948);
Charles F. Bouldin, 8 T. C. 959 (1947).
6. J. Kenneth Hull, P-H 1948 TC M=. Dc. ff 48,121 (1948); Dudley A. Chapln,
9 T. C. 142 (1947); Louis C. Beauchamp, P-H 1947 TC Mxm. DEc. 11 47,088 (1947);
Arthur J. H. Johnson, 7 T. C. 1040 (1946). But see Charles F. Bouldin, 8 T. C. 959
(1947).
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purpose of the amendment was "that a nonresident American citizen who establishes
a home, maintains his establishment and is taking on corresponding obligations of
the home in any foreign country may enjoy the exemptions. And so that technicians,
American citizens who are merely temporarily away from home, could be reached
for taxation purposes."'7
In William B. Cruises and Carl H. ThorselP the Tax Court extended the strict
war worker test to cases where the taxpayers were only indirectly connected with
war work and were subject to conditions entirely unlike those of the employees
mentioned in the cases above. Cruise was hired as a Red Cross club director in
London and Thorsell as an insurance agent in the British West Indies. Neither of
the taxpayers was at any time subject to military control nor did they live with
other employees in barracks or huts. But in each case it was determined by the
court that they were not bona fide residents of the foreign countries since in the
Cruise case, although the taxpayer testified that he intended to stay in England
after the term of his employment was over, there was nothing in the record to show
that he ever took any action indicative of an intention to remain; and in the Thorsell
case since the taxpayer kept all family and business connections in the United States
and intended to return as soon as his job abroad was over it was said that he was a
sojourner rather than a bona fide resident.
In other cases where the Tax Court has considered the problem it is difficult to
find the exact criteria required to be met to bring the taxpayer within the exemption.
If the taxpayer is a married man then one of the most important points considered
is whether he left his family in the United States or had them come to the foreign
country with him.10 In one case the court dated the taxpayer's bona fide residence
from the time when he moved from a hotel in the foreign country into an apartment
and arranged for his family to come there and live.1 ' Of the other tests to be applied,
one is whether taxes were paid to the foreign government. The payment or non-
payment of taxes is not in itself considered to be conclusive as to residence but is an
evidentiary fact to be weighed along with everything else.'- If the preponderance
of the evidence shows residence then a failure to pay taxes will not deprive the
taxpayer of his exemption, but if he has paid taxes the act is considered to be that
of a resident rather than of a mere transient or sojourner.13 The taxpayer's intention
both before he goes to the foreign country and during his stay there as to the
permanency of his stay is another point relied on by the court to show residence.1 4
Although the court has said that it is not necessary to determine where the taxpayer
7. H. R. Rep. No. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 743 (1943).
S. 12 T. C. 1059 (1949).
9. 13 T. C. 909 (1949).
10. David E. Rose, 16 T. C. 232 (1951) (petitioner took his family, personal effects
and furniture and leased an apartment for five years); Charles F. Bouldin, 8 T. C. 959
(1947) (petitioner although unmarried when he went to Canada married while there. His
wife was an American citizen but agreed to live in Canada).
11. See Herman F. Baehre, 15 T. C. 236 (1950).
12. Robert W. Seeley, 14 T. C. 175 (1950), rev'd, 186 F. 2d 541 (2d Cir. 1951); William
B. Cruise, 12 T. C. 1059 (1949).
13. See Audio G. Harvey, 10 T. C. 183 (1948).
14. In C. Francis Weeks, 16 T. C. 248 (1951), the court said that petitioner had no
intention of becoming a permanent resident of Iran but that at all time his intention to
return to the United States was fixed and definite except as to time. See also Arthur J. H.
Johnson, 7 T. C. 1049 (1946).
1952]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
was domiciled but only where his bona fide residence was, the cases in which bona
fide residence has been found tend to show facts more consistent with domicile than
with mere residence.' 5 This would seem to indicate the Tax Court treats bona fide
.residence in a foreign country as the equivalent of domicile.
This apparent confusion of residence and domicile was clearly revealed in the
case of Myers v. Commissioner.'0 There the Tax Court refused to find that the
taxpayer was a bona fide resident of Nassau even though, after his original contract
of employment as chief engineer on a construction project in Nassau from May 1942
until December 1943 expired, he accepted a position with a Nassau engineering
company and remained so employed until war conditions terminated the connection
in March 1944. Petitioner early in 1943 had moved his wife to Nassau and they
had lived there together until their return to the United States. However on appeal
this decision was reversed by the Circuit Court, the court saying that the fact that
petitioner moved his wife to Nassau would indicate that he acquired domicile there
as early as 1943; that the idea of domicile is not inconsistent with that of residence
and that in the tax statute residence is used in the limited sense as contrasted with
domicile. Citing Commissioner v. Swent"7 the court said, "'Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while 'domicile' requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."' 8
A Circuit Court decided Downs v. Commissioner,'0 a war contract case, in accord
with the reasoning and decisions of the Tax Court and held that the taxpayer was
not a bona fide resident of a foreign country for the purpose of exemption from
taxation. In general, however, the federal courts have been more liberal in con-
struing the requirements of bona fide residence. In Seeley v. Commissioner20 the
Circuit Court, reversing the Tax Court which held that the taxpayer was not a
resident of London but was a mere sojourner, adhered closely to the requirements
set out in Treasury Regulation 111. On the basis that the taxpayer's purpose, which
was to obtain certain reports for his employer, was not one which was sure to be
accomplished promptly, that he had no definite intention as to the length of his
stay and that an extended stay might be necessary to accomplish his purpose, the
court held him to be a bona fide resident even though his family did not accompany
him and he did not pay taxes to the foreign government. The court noted that if
the taxpayer's wife had accompanied him there could have been no fair question
that London would have been their temporary home, but because of travel restric-
tions she could not go. The court said, "Such husbands were pro tanto in the same
position as single men."''u
In other cases the federal courts have pointed out that although a failure to pay
taxes to the foreign government is relevant to the question of residence it is not
conclusive and is not a condition precedent to exemption under the statute;22 that
residence simply requires bodily presence in the foreign country for the required
15. See e.g., Audio G. Harvey, 10 T. C. 183 (1948); David E. Rose, 16 T. C. 232
(1951); Charles F. Bouldin, 8 T. C. 959 (1947); Herman F. Baehre, 15 T. C. 235 (1950).
16. 180 F. 2d 969 (4th Cir. 1950), reversing, O'Kelly v. Myers, P-H 1949 TC Mzmxt
DEC. fI 49,099 (1949).
17. 155 F. 2d 513 (4th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 801 (1947).
18. 180 F. 2d 969, 971 (4th Cir. 1950).
19. 166 F. 2d 504 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 832 (1948).
20. 186 F. 2d 541 (2d Cir. 1951).
21. Id. at 544.
22. See Chidester v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 322 (Ct. CI. 1949); White v. Hoffer-
bart, 88 F. Supp. 457 (D. Md. 1950).
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length of time;23 that the phrase "making his home temporarily in a place" does
not mean necessarily buying a house or changing domicile but means no more than
living there temporarily24 and that temporary absence from the foreign country on
business or vacation trips does not defeat the exemption.2-
In the instant case, however, the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of
the District Court that the taxpayer was a resident of Saudi Arabia has apparently
adopted the criteria of the Tax Court. The facts indicate that petitioner complied
with Treasury Regulation 111. True his family remained in the United States while
he was abroad and he paid no taxes to the foreign government but his contract of
employment was for eighteen months and it was understood that he could afterwards
obtain other work in the area. He did not intend to leave until he had saved enough
money to buy a farm, and he thought it would take about three years to accomplish
that purpose. He therefore intended to stay in Saudi Arabia for the eighteen months
and for a further indefinite period. At the time his contract expired he Vs offered
other employment and the only reason he did not accept was his dissatisfaction
with certain personnel changes. Thus the purpose in going to the foreign country
was of such a nature that an extended stay would be necessary for its accomplish-
ment and the period of that stay beyond eighteen months was indefinite as to time.
The mentioned inconsistencies and lack of definiteness relative to the requirements
of residence have made it difficult, if not impossible, for a taxpayer to know whether
he is within the exemption, and have indicated the need for further congressional
action.
Since the principal case was decided, Section 116 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code has been amended to provide for exemption in the case of an individual citizen
of the United States who during any period of eighteen consecutive months is present
in a foreign country or countries during at least five hundred and ten full days in
such period.2 6
Under the latter section there will be no necessity for a determination by the
court as to whether there was a bona fide residence. A taxpayer will be entitled to
the exemption merely upon showing that he was present in the foreign country for
the specified number of days in eighteen consecutive months. An application of the
Section to the principal case illustrates its importance. The taxpayer's employment
in Saudi Arabia commenced October 6, 1944, and he returned to the United States
on May 25, 1946. He was present for more than five hundred and ten days out of
eighteen consecutive months and therefore would be entitled to the exemption. The
same would undoubtedly be true of many of the decided cases where the exemption
was denied because bona fide residence as interpreted by the courts had not been
shown.
TORTS-RIGHT or PRiVACcy-UNAuTHoRIzED TELEVASING OP ENTERTAINMENT
DURING INTE-RMssION or BALLGA.-Plaintiff, a well-known producer of animal
acts, performed between the halves of a professional football game in Washington,
D. C., pursuant to a contract with the defendant Pro-Football, Inc. The plaintiff's
act was televised at that time by the defendant American Broadcasting Company
23. See Mlyers v. Commissioner, 180 F. 2d 969 (4th Cir. 1950).
24. See Swenson v. Thomas, 164 F. 2d 783 (Sth Cir. 1947).
25. See Yaross v. Kraemer, 83 F. Supp. 411 (D. Conn. 1949); White v. Hofferbart,
88 F. Supp. 457 (D. Md. 1950).
26. Revenue Act of 1951, § 321 (a) (2), 65 STAT. 452 (1951).
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and was seen on an estimated 17,000 television sets in the New York area. Com-
mercial announcements were made both prior and subsequent to the telecast of the
plaintiff's act. Plaintiff sued, alleging that the defendants, without authorization,
used his name and picture for advertising purposes and for the purposes of trade
in violation of Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. On appeal from a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, held, one justice dissenting, judgment reversed on
the ground that the name and picture of the plaintiff were not used for advertising
or trade purposes since the telecast was a factual presentation of a matter of public
interest. Moreover the court held that in the light of the history of Section 51
and its judicial interpretation, the statute was never intended to apply whore a
plaintiff seeks recovery for injury to his property or business and not to his person-
ality. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc. et al., 278 App. Div. 431, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 553
(1st Dep't 1951).
This is the first case in a state court of New York involving the invasion of privacy
by television.1 Since television is so new a medium there is a paucity of decided
cases pertaining to it in conjunction with the right of privacy. One of the most
recent is Peterson v. KMTR Radio Corp.2 which was decided in California, a state
which recognizes a common law right of privacy.3 There, plaintiffs, acquatic stars,
performed their act for the benefit of charity and were televised without their con-
sent. The court denied plaintiffs' recovery holding that a performer or participant
in a4 public, semi-public or private show or event where other persons attend thereby
waives his right of privacy so far as that performance or event is concerned. 4 Since
New York has specifically denied the existence of a common law right of privacy,5
the only recourse to a person claiming an invasion of privacy is by statute. Sec-
tion 50 of the New York Civil Rights Law provides: "A person, firm or corporation
that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait
or picture of any living person without first having obtained the written consent of
such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor." Section 51 provides for the recovery of damages.
The courts of this state have held as actionable the unauthorized use of a person's
name or picture in direct connection with and as part of advertising.0 For example,
liability has been found where a plaintiff's name or photograph appeared within the
boundaries of a newspaper advertisement. 7 The only exception to this rule occurs
in the incidental mention of a person's name or picture within the boundaries of a
paid advertisement but unrelated to the advertised business or product.8 The court
1. See Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc. et al., 198 Misc. 850, 851, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 812, 813
(N. Y. City Ct. 1951). See also Sharkey v. The National Broadcasting Co., 93 F. Supp.
986 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), where the defendant showed newsreel pictures of the plaintiff, a
famous boxer, in some of his past fights. The program televised was "Famous Fights of
the Century." The court held that the complaint stated a cause of action under N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTs LAW §§ 50, 51.
2. Case No. 557,555 (L. A. Super. Ct. 1949) (not officially reported).
3. See Melvin v. Reed et a., 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
4. The court also denied recovery on the basis of quantum meruit and on the basis
of unfair competition.
5. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. et al., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. B. 442 (1902).
6. See e.g., Lane v. Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66, 11 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct.), at'd
mem., 256 App. Div. 1065, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 352 (1st Dep't 1939).
7. Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
8. Wallach v. Bacharach et al., 192 Misc. 979, 80 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 274
App. Div. 919, 84 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1st Dep't 1948). See also 49 CoL. L. Rav. 282 (1949).
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held in the instant case that in the absence of exploitation of a name or picture in
the commercial announcement or in direct connection with the product itself, there
was no use for advertising purposes. An analogy may be drawn between newspapers
and television in that a sustaining program, like the one in the instant case, con-
tains matters of public interest and of advertisement. However in newspapers.
matters of advertisement are dearly set off from matters of news and visual in-
spection -will suffice to determine whether the name or picture is used in connection
with advertising2 while there is no such lucid delineation in televised advertisements.
Many television commercials do not appear solely in the beginning, middle and con-
clusion of a program. Rather, they are injected throughout the program at varied
intervals. In addition, it is not uncommon to see a sponsor's product superimposed
upon the picture of the program. At times it is not possible to discern wherein an
advertisement commences and where it concludes. Therefore the rules established
for determining whether the use of a name, portrait or picture in a newspaper or
periodical is for advertising purposes may prove inadequate in the television cases.
For the purpose of determining whether the trade purposes section of the statute
should be invoked, the material question is whether the ever-present commercial
factor is outweighed by the educational or informative content of the subject.10
Though a publisher's primary motive in sponsoring a telecast is to increase the sale
of his commodity, he is immune from the interdict of the statute so long as he
presents matters of public import.11 If a meeting of the United Nations -were
sponsored via television, there would undoubtedly be no question but that the news-
worthiness of the program would overbalance the fact that it was sponsored. By
the same token, an opposite result would be reached if a telecast of pure entertain-
ment were sponsored. Though the court in this case found that the plaintiff's act
was entertainment but televised in connection with a matter of public interest, 2
it is submitted that the privilege accorded to news and matters of public import
should not be extended to cover the facts in the instant case. The plaintiff's act
was not an integral part of the football game. It could well have been omitted
from the telecast. Had the defendants taken "still pictures" of the plaintiff in con-
junction with his animals and used them for purposes of trade, the court would
undoubtedly invoke the protection of the statute.13 Certainly the defendants should
not find shelter from liability because they used a more potent instrument for the
invasion of privacy: the television camera. There is no language in our statute nor
in the judicial interpretation of it that differentiates a "still picture" from a "moving
picture."' -4 The fact that the act was presented factually should not preclude the
9. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc. et al., 278 App. Div. 431, 434, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 553, 556
(1st Dep't 1951).
10. See Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 Micn. L. RIv. 526, 549 (1941).
11. See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F. 2d 806, 810 (2d Cir. 1940).
12. See Humiston v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co. et al., 189 App. Div. 467, 178
N.Y. Supp. 752 (1st Dep't 1919).
13. In Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 176 Misc. 714, 28 N.Y.S.2d 811
(Sup. Ct. 1941), defendants placed a picture of the plaintiff, public performer, on the
programs of the event in which plaintiff performed. Plaintiff sued for the breach of his
right of privacy and recovered si cents.
14. Humiston v. Universal Film Manuacturing Co. et al., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N.Y.
Supp. 752 (1st Dep't 1919). "I am unable to see any practical difference between the
presentation . . . in a motion picture film and in a newspaper...." Id. at 474, 178 N.Y.
Supp. at 757.
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plaintiff from establishing a cause of action based on the violation of his right of
privacy since the truth or falsity of the publication does not of itself determine
whether said publication comes within the ban of the statute.15 The "fact or fiction
test" is applicable only after it has been determined that the publication is one of
a matter of news interest to the general public.'o The court finally pointed out that
the statute was not intended to apply to a case where the plaintiff sues for the un-
lawful intrusion upon his business rather than upon his personality.
It is not necessary for a plaintiff who bases his cause of action on the breach of
his right of privacy to plead or prove actual damages.1T Although the infringement
of the plaintiff's privacy in the instant case be minimal,18 and although the damage
to his property interest "inherent and inextricably interwoven in the individual's
personality"'19 might far outweigh the damage to his privacy, nevertheless it would
seem that the existence of additional remedies does not militate against the action
for invasion to privacy.
Television is the most revealing medium yet invented for the dissemination of news
and entertainment. While newspapers can report occurrences without the use of
names or pictures, 20 television brings to its audience, in life-like portrayal, the name,
picture and voice of the person in question.21 Its potentiality for the invasion of
an individual's privacy far surpasses that of any other medium. Therefore it is
submitted that a more rigid interpretation be given the statute in cases involving
alleged breaches of privacy by the new medium than in cases involving other media.
A reporter's 'account of the misfortunes of a former boy genius have been held to
be outside the statute.2 2 However a candid television portrayal of the same incidents
without the knowledge or consent of the subject would certainly seem to require
some relief.
15. See Koussevitsky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc. et al., 188 Misc. 479, 484, 68
N.Y.S. 2d 779, 783 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 432 (1st
Dep't 1947). See also Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193, 218
(1890).
16. See 20 FORD. L. REv. 100, 102 (1951).
17. See Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 176 Misc. 714, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 811
(Sup. Ct. 1941).
18. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc. et al., 278 App. Div. 431, 438, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553,
560 (1st Dep't 1951).
19. Ibid. See also Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 277 N.Y. 707, 14 N.E.2d
636 (1938).
20. See Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MIcH. L. REv. 526, 544 (1941).
21. The court in the principal case held that New York had jurisdiction and applied
New York law. No reasons were given. The law to be applied is the lex loci delicths.
RESTATEmENT, CoNFmcT or LAWS § 378 (1934). The place of the wrong is that place
where the last event necessary to make the actor liable occurs. Id. § 377. An Interesting
question is raised with respect to a telecast and that is, where is the "last event"? By
inference, the instant court held that the last event does not occur at the situs where the
event takes place. Whether the situs is where the telecast is viewed or where the master
control board of the television station is situated is still an open question. See Note, 60
HARv. L. Rxv. 941 (1947).
22. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
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